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Abstract
This paper describes how a child allowance policy and income transfer to older
people policy alter fertility and economic growth under a pay-as-you-go pension
system. Moreover, this paper presents ways to ﬁnance such policies: one for income
taxation and the other for consumption tax. The results presented in this paper
are as follows. First, the relation between fertility and economic growth depends on
fertility. This relation is positive if fertility is at a certain level. However, if fertility
is low or high, this relation is negative.
Second, a child allowance does not always raise the fertility rate. On the other
hand, income transfer to older people raises the fertility rate. This result underscores
that it is important to consider policies for older people when considering how to
raise the fertility rate. Income transfer to older people ﬁnanced by consumption
taxation can achieve two goals: increasing fertility in a society with fewer children,
and providing income security for older people.
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11 Introduction
The total fertility rate (TFR) in Japan in 2007 was 1.34. Recent statistical projections
related to fertility rates show a decreasing trend. A decreasing trend in the number of
children holds not only in Japan, but also in other developed countries, as portrayed in
Fig. 1.
[Insert Fig. 1 around here.]
The fertility in these countries is low, as presented in Fig. 1; however, these countries are
roughly divisible into two groups: countries for which fertility continues to decrease and
countries for which fertility has stopped decreasing and instead increases. Italy, Germany,
and Japan belong to the former countries. France and Sweden are of the latter group of
countries. Fertility stopped decreasing in France and Sweden because those governments
came to spend funds to support family policies. Figure 2 portrays the transition of
government expenditures related to family policy in developed countries.
[Insert Fig. 2 around here.]
As portrayed in Fig. 2, the ratio of expenditures for family policy to GDP is large in
France and Sweden, where fertility has changed from negative to increase. However, it is
low in Italy and Japan, where fertility continues to decrease. The government expenditure
for family policies, which includes expenditures for child-care service or child allowance,
is considered as public child care. We can say that increased fertility occurs if this
expenditure level is high. For example, fertility and government expenditures for family
policies in Sweden and France is higher than that in Japan.1. Therefore, it is necessary
that the government give the child allowance actively as in France and Sweden, and
thereby bears child-care costs publicly: Japan must increase the expenditures for family
policies actively to raise the fertility rate in Japan.
Why must the government restore declining fertility? It must do so because the
government is obligated to manage the social security system. Social security systems
1The child allowance level in France is higher than that in Japan. In Japan, the child allowance is
given for children of elementary school age. In France, the child allowance is given for children less than
20 years old, except for the ﬁrst-born child. The amount of child allowance is 10,000 yen per month
in Japan. The amount in France is 19,000 yen for the second child (25,000 yen for the third child). In
addition to this allowance, children more than 11 years old are given a higher allowance (Data: Cabinet
Oﬃce, Government of Japan (2007):“White Paper on Birthrate-Declining Society”)
2such as those of health insurance and pension systems must be supported by younger
generations. Unless the population of the young generation is suﬃciently large, the
social security system can not be maintained. Concretely, the government must collect
a contribution from younger people to run the pay-as-you-go pension system. If the
population of the younger generation is small, then the pension that older people receive
under the constant contribution rate would be small, too. If the government were to ﬁx
the pension paid to older people, the burden of the younger people would become large.
Therefore, unless the population is suﬃciently large, the government can not aﬀord to
pay pension to older people suﬃciently and maintain the system.
In the public pension system in Japan, beneﬁts for the older people are ﬁnanced not
only by the contributions of younger people but also by tax revenues (National General
Account).2 In recent years, the burden of the national general account has tended to
increase, as shown in Fig. 3.
[Insert Fig. 3 around here.]
Consequently, with the burden of the national general account, the government can
pay some pension beneﬁts for the older people even if the government can not collect
contributions from younger people because of the small young population. However,
the government must carry out policies to stem the decline in fertility to maintain a
sustainable pension system. In carrying out such a policy, the government must consider
the income of older people. However, it is considered that a tradeoﬀ relation holds
between the child allowance for younger people and the income transfer to older people.
If the income transfer to older people increases, then younger people can not receive a
suﬃcient child allowance; thereby, we can not expect increased fertility. On the other
hand, if the child allowance for younger people increases, older people can not receive a
suﬃcient income. This paper describes how the intergenerational balance of burden and
beneﬁt aﬀects fertility and the economic growth rate; it also describes what policies are
desirable in terms of stemming the decline in fertility or income transfer to older people
under a model such as an intergenerational tradeoﬀ.
2The national basic pension liability in Japan is shared by the national general account.
3Some reports have described how fertility determines pay-as-you-go pension systems.
Groezen, Leers and Meijdam (2003) and Hirazawa and Yakita (2008) show that the
existence of market failure resulting from externality generates pay-as-you-go pension
system failures.3 Hirazawa and Yakita (2008) report that the dynamics of fertility might
ﬂuctuate because of existence of a pay-as-you-go pension system.4 The analyses used in
these studies assume not a closed economy, which considers capital accumulation, but
rather a small open economy. Oshio (2001) and Yasuoka (2006) demonstrate whether
the child allowance raises the fertility rate or not under a closed economy model. These
studies show how the government collects revenue to spend for the child allowance in
addition to the result derived by Groezen, Leers, and Meijdam (2003), who show that it
is necessary to raise the fertility rate using the child allowance. Yasuoka (2006) shows
that the government should collect revenues not by labor income taxation, which greatly
decreases saving, i.e. the capital per capita, but instead by consumption taxation.
Some reports of the relevant literature analyze the pension system under a model with-
out endogenous fertility (Br¨ auninger (2005), Corneo and Marquart (2000), Ono (2007)).
Br¨ auninger (2005) and Corneo and Marquart (2000) show that a pay-as-you-go pension
system imparts a negative eﬀect on economic growth. On the other hand, Ono (2007)
shows that an increase in the contribution rate of the pension raises the employment rate
and stabilizes the economy.
Yasuoka and Goto (2009) show how fertility determines under a small open economy
which adopts a pay-as-you-go pension system. Moreover, they describe how the child
allowance aﬀects fertility and the welfare, how it is ﬁnanced to spend for the child al-
lowance, and how both increased fertility by the child allowance and the direct income
transfer to older people aﬀects for the welfare of older people. They derive the result that
the level of a consumption tax or child-care cost determines the dynamics of fertility: one
for the convergence and the other for divergence. This paper describes a closed economy,
which is not considered by Yasuoka and Goto (2009).
3Groezen, Leers, and Meijdam (2003) show that fertility in a decentralized economy does not coincide
with that of the command optimum. Then, the policy to increase the fertility is justiﬁed.
4Hirazawa and Yakita (2008) assume a fertility function, into which is inputted the child-care service
and a parent’s child-care time. With a pay-as-you-go pension system, a parent’s child care ﬂuctuates
over time. If this eﬀect is large, then fertility ﬂuctuates, too.
4Results of those analyses suggest the following conclusions. On the balanced growth
path, the relation between fertility and the economic growth rate is positive if fertility
is positive to some degree, but this relation becomes negative if fertility is either low or
high. Moreover, a child allowance can not always raise the fertility rate. Nevertheless,
an income transfer to older people by a consumption tax certainly raises the fertility
rate. This result shows that increased lifetime income attributable to increased income
transfer to older people can raise the fertility rate. However, even if fertility increases, it
is possible to decrease the economic growth rate. Therefore, an increase in the tax rate
to increase the income transfer brings about an increase in the income transfer in the
short run. However, the income transfer and pension beneﬁt decreases because of the
decrease in the economic growth rate in the long run.
The remainder of this paper is presented as follows: Section 2 introduces the model
and Section 3 presents a description of the equilibrium. Section 4 assesses child-care and
transfer policies for older people. The ﬁnal section presents conclusions of this study.
2 The Model
The model economy is based on a two-period (young and old) overlapping generations
model. This economy has agents of three types: households, ﬁrms, and a government.
2.1 Households
Households experience two periods: young and old. During the young period, each house-
hold supplies labor to earn labor income. The household also raises children. These
analyses assume that it is necessary for households (parents) to invest in child care to
have children. Households have one unit of time, which is assumed to be supplied for
labor inelasticity. During the old period, each household only consumes. The government
runs a pay-as-you-go pension system and imposes labor income taxation and consump-
tion taxation to provide a child allowance and income transfer to older people. Each
household distributes its labor income among child-care goods and other consumption.
Consequently, we obtain the following budget constraint.
(1 + τc)c1t +
(1 + τc)c2t+1
1 + rt+1
+ (zt − qt)nt = (1 − τ)(1 − φnt)wt − ˜ pt +
pt+1 + ¯ nt˜ pt+1
1 + rt+1
(1)
5The analyses presented in this paper assume that child-care goods are not taxed, and
therefore do not aﬀect fertility negatively.5 Herein, ˜ pt represents contributions paid by
younger people, where ˆ p represents the contribution rate, or the constant rate of income
collected by the government. Running a pay-as-you-go pension, the pension which older
people receive is ¯ nt˜ pt+1, where ¯ nt represents an average fertility in t period, which means
the intergenerational population size ratio, i.e. the share of younger people size Nt+1 to
older people size Nt in t+1 period (¯ nt =
Nt+1
Nt ). The beneﬁt rate is ¯ nt
wt+1
wt . Furthermore,
regarding this pension beneﬁt, older people also receive an income transfer ﬁnanced by
taxation. The government imposes a consumption tax on consumption both by younger
people and older people and a labor income tax on labor income. The consumption tax
rate and labor income tax rate are denoted respectively as τc and τ. In addition, wt and
rt+1 respectively represent the wage rate and interest rate. Furthermore, φ denotes the
child-care time per child, thereby labor time reduces 1 − φnt. With an increase in the
number of children nt, the labor time decreases.6 In these analyses, zt denotes the child-
care goods cost per child. The child-care goods cost is assumed as zt = ˆ zwt. If the income
level becomes higher, then the child-care goods cost becomes higher, too. Assuming that
qt denotes the child allowance per child, it is assumed qt = ˆ qwt, where ˆ q represents the
beneﬁt rate of the child allowance. Therefore, z−q+φ(1−τ)wt = (ˆ z−ˆ q+φ(1−τ))wt shows
the cost of having a child. In addition, c1t and c2t+1 respectively represent consumption
by younger people and older people.
A household’s utility function ut is given as follows:7
ut = αlnc1t + β lnc2t+1 + γ lnnt, 0 < α,β,γ < 1. (2)
An individual chooses consumption during young and old life c1t,c2t+1 and chooses the
number of children nt to maximize lifetime utility subject to the lifetime budget con-
5Even if child-care goods are subject to a consumption tax, the result derived in this paper holds.
See Section 4 for the proof.
6This paper assumes that the child-care time per child is constant; thereby the child-care cost per
child is also constant. Some earlier studies included the assumption that the child-care cost per child
depends on the number of children (Zhang and Zhang (1998)). However, some studies assume constant
child-care cost per child (Galor and Weil).
7This assumption is conventional in modeling of endogenous fertility: Eckstein and Wolpin (1985),
Galor and Weil (1996) and Groezen, Leers, and Meijdam (2003)
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￿
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￿
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α + β + γ
(1 − τ)wt +
pt+1+¯ nt˜ pt+1
1+rt+1 − ˜ pt
zt − qt + φ(1 − τ)wt
. (5)




α + β + γ
(1 − τ) − ˆ p +
pt+1+¯ ntˆ pwt+1
wt(1+rt+1)
ˆ z − ˆ q + φ(1 − τ)
(6)
Under constant income, which older people receive pt+1 + ¯ ntˆ pwt+1, an increase in the
wage rate of wt diminishes fertility for the following reason. An increase in wt increases
fertility because of increased income, however, an increase in child-care costs, which
shows an opportunity cost to care for children (loss of wage income not to supply labor),
decreases the fertility rate. In this model, the latter eﬀect is greater than the former one.
2.2 Firms
The production function of ﬁnal goods is given as a neoclassical constant-returns-to-scale
function:
Yt = Kθ
t (AtLt)1−θ, 0 < θ < 1, (7)
where At ≡ Kt
Lt
1
b is assumed as described in Grossman and Yanagawa (1993). In addition,
Yt and Kt respectively represent the ﬁnal goods and capital stock. Moreover, Lt denotes
labor input, and Nt denotes younger population size. Because each labor time is 1−φnt,
the labor input is given asLt = (1−φnt)Nt. Each ﬁrm determines the demand for capital
stock and labor to maximize the proﬁt under given At. Assuming perfect competition,







1 + rt =
θ
b1−θ, (9)
where kt ≡ Kt
Nt and the capital stock is fully depreciated in one period. Moreover, the
interest rate is constant over time in this production function (rt = rt+1 = r). However,
7the wage rate wt increases concomitantly with per-capita capital kt. Then, the income





is yt = kt
b1−θ. Consequently, the growth rate of per-




kt is equivalent to the growth rate of capital stock per
capita.
2.3 Government
The government imposes labor income taxation at a tax rate τ and consumption at a tax
rate τc to provide a child allowance and beneﬁt for older people. The government budget
constraint is
Ntqnt + Nt−1pt = Ntτ(1 − φnt)wt + τc(Ntc1t + Nt−1c2t). (10)
Then, the per-capita beneﬁt for older people is shown as follows.
pt+1 = nt
￿









The income transfer to older people pt+1 decreases if the beneﬁt rate of child allowance
ˆ q increases to raise the fertility rate. Furthermore, if the income tax rate increases, the
income transfer to older people pt+1 increases. However, fertility might decrease because
of a decrease in disposable income by an increase in the tax rate. Consequently, an
increase in the income tax rate does not always increase the income transfer to older
people.
3 Equilibrium
In this economy, the dynamics of capital stock kt and fertility nt specify the equilibrium.
First, we derive the dynamics of capital stock kt. These dynamics are represented by






An individual saving st is as presented below.
st ≡ (1 − τ)(1 − φnt)wt − ˜ pt − (zt − qt)nt − (1 + τc)c1t
= (1 − τ)wt − ˜ pt −
α + γ
γ
(zt − qt + φ(1 − τ)wt)nt. (13)
8Therefore, the dynamics equation is as shown below.
kt+1 =

















(ˆ z − ˆ q + φ(1 − τ))
￿
kt (14)
Consequently, the economic growth rate 1 + gt ≡
yt+1
yt is

















(ˆ z − ˆ q + φ(1 − τ))
￿
. (15)















γ(ˆ z − ˆ q + φ(1 − τ)) − τφ − ˆ q
. (16)
Consequently, capital in the subsequent period kt+1 depends on kt and nt; fertility in the
next period nt+1 is determined. Considering (15) and (16), we can show the dynamics








(ˆ z − ˆ q + φ(1 − τ)) − τφ − ˆ q
￿

















Then, the following shows the dynamics of nt.
[Insert Fig. 4 around here.]
Figure 4-1 portrays the case of
dnt+1
dnt > 0. The unique or two-steady-state situation exists.






γ (ˆ z−ˆ q+φ(1−τ))−τφ−ˆ q−
φθ
1−θ
is negative, then a unique, unstable
steady state exists. A stable steady state and an unstable steady state exist if this sign
is positive. Figure 4-1 shows the condition of τc
1+τc
α
γ(ˆ z− ˆ q+φ(1−τ))−τφ− ˆ q > 0. With
a two-steady-state equilibrium, if initial fertility is not large, then fertility converges to
the steady state with low fertility. The fertility continues increasing if the initial fertility
is larger than fertility at the unstable steady state. The fertility continues decreasing if




γ(ˆ z − ˆ q + φ(1 − τ)) − τφ − ˆ q > 0, then the dynamics of fertility
ﬂuctuates as depicted in Fig. 4-2. The stable condition −1 <
dnt+1
dnt < 0 as the following








































dnt < 1, the steady state is stable. The dynamics converges with ﬂuctuation
if −1 <
dnt+1
dnt < 0. The dynamics converges monotonically if 0 <
dnt+1
dnt < 1.
We show how the economic growth rate changes when fertility changes. Considering










(2φnt − 1)((1 − τ) − ˆ p) −
α + γ
γ







dn is ambiguous; however, this sign is determined by the level of fertility.
Deﬁning ˆ L ≡ ((1 − τ) − ˆ p)(2φn − 1) and ˆ R ≡
α+γ
γ (ˆ z − ˆ q + φ(1 − τ))φn2, we show Fig. 5
under some parametric conditions.
[Insert Fig. 5 around here.]
The relation between fertility and the growth rate is not determined uniquely if two
intersections exist. This relation is negative if fertility is either low or high. However,
fertility of some positive and medium range makes this relation is positive. Then, the
following proposition is established.
Proposition 1 Under some parametric conditions, the relation between fertility and
economic growth rate is negative if fertility is low or high. On the other hand, if fertility
is in some range, then this condition is positive.
This proposition does not always hold. For example, with large ˆ z or small ˆ q, the
intersection vanishes because ˆ R moves more above. Without the intersection, the relation
between fertility and growth rate is always negative. With small ˆ z or large ˆ q, this relation
changes from negative to positive: this relation is determined by the level of child-care
goods cost or the beneﬁt rate of the child allowance. Child-care time φ does not always
enlarge the area for which this relation is positive.
Therefore, if fertility continues increasing over time, it is possible that the economic
growth rate changes a decrease to an increase and changes to a decrease thereafter.
Conversely, if fertility continues decreasing over time, it is possible that the relation
between fertility and the economic growth rate changes over time.
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￿
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We depict two ﬁgures because of the sign of L. The intersections show the stable steady
states.
[Insert Fig. 6 around here.]
Figure 6-1 presents the possibility that two intersections show fertility at the steady state.
However, we do not consider the intersection, which shows higher fertility because this
is fertility at the unstable steady state.
4 Policy Eﬀects
This section presents analysis of how an increase in the beneﬁt rate of child allowance ˆ q
or an increase in the income transfer to older people with an increase in the consumption
tax rate τc or income tax rate τ aﬀects fertility and the growth rate at the stable steady
state.
4.1 Increase in the Beneﬁt Rate of the Child Allowance ˆ q
An increase in the beneﬁt rate of the child allowance ˆ q under constant consumption tax
rate τc and income tax rate τ decreases the income transfer to older people. However, if
this increase brings about an increase in fertility or the growth rate, the income transfer
to older people increases. Therefore, the older person income increases, too. As portrayed
in Fig. 7, an increase in the beneﬁt rate of the child allowance ˆ h does not increase fertility.
[Insert Fig. 7 around here.]
11The economic growth rate also increases if an increase in the beneﬁt rate of the child
allowance increases fertility and the fertility is within some range. Then, the pension
beneﬁt that older people receive is large. Consequently, it is possible that the beneﬁt for
older people increases even if an increase in the beneﬁt rate of child allowance produces
an income transfer to older people directly in the short term. However, if fertility is low
or high, this policy does not always increase pension beneﬁts for older people because of
a decrease in the economic growth rate. Conversely, an increase in the beneﬁt rate of
child allowance might increase pension beneﬁts for older people because of the increased
economic growth rate even if this policy decreases the fertility rate.
Moreover, this policy aﬀects the economic growth rate directly. Therefore, this policy
prevents a decrease in the economic growth rate even if this policy decreases the economic
growth rate indirectly through increased fertility.
4.2 Increased Income Transfer Financed by an Increase in the
Income Tax Rate τ
An increase in the income tax rate τ raises the ratio of income transfer to older people
to total tax revenue. However, tax revenue is aﬀected not only by the change of tax rate,
but also by the change of the economic growth rate. It decreases not only the income
transfer to older people but also the pension beneﬁt for them if an increase in the income
tax rate decreases the fertility rate. In reality, it is ambiguous whether fertility increases
or decreases.
[Insert Fig. 8 around here.]
Therefore, this policy eﬀect is nearly identical to the eﬀect of an increase in the
beneﬁt rate of child allowance. However, an increase in the income transfer to older
people ﬁnanced by an increase in the income tax rate directly decreases the economic







> 0, i.e., if fertility is low, then the change of the income tax rate
increases the economic growth rate directly. On the other hand, if fertility is higher than
a certain level, then this change decreases the economic growth rate directly.
124.3 Increase in Income Transfer Financed by an Increase in the
Consumption Tax Rate τc
An increase in the consumption tax rate τc raises the income transfer to older people.
However, this policy brings about a result that diﬀers from the cases of an increase in the
beneﬁt rate of child allowance or income transfer ﬁnanced by an increase in the income
tax rate. This policy certainly raises the fertility rate.
[Insert Fig. 9 around here.]
Increased income transfer to older people ﬁnanced by an increase in the consumption
tax rate raises the fertility rate. In addition to this eﬀect, if fertility is in a certain
range, this policy raises the economic growth rate, too. Then, both income transfer
and the pension beneﬁt for older people certainly increase. Moreover, the change of the
consumption tax rate does not aﬀect economic growth directly. The indirect eﬀect occurs
because the change of fertility derived by the change of the consumption tax rate aﬀects
economic growth. Consequently, the following proposition is established.
Proposition 2 On the balanced growth path, the increase in the beneﬁt rate of the
child allowance or income transfer ﬁnanced by an increase in the income tax rate does
not always raise the fertility rate. However, an income transfer ﬁnanced by consumption
tax surely raises the fertility rate.
Why does an increased income transfer ﬁnanced by consumption tax raise the fertility
rate? This answer is increased lifetime income. In OECD countries, the fertility rate
is low, so governments seek to increase fertility. Simultaneously, the government must
consider the income policy for older people. If the government adopts this policy, then two
policy goals are achieved in an aging society with fewer children: increased fertility and
an increase in the income transfer and pension beneﬁts for older people. Policymakers
are likely to consider an increase in the child allowance to raise the fertility rate, but
this policy does not always raise the fertility rate. Because the positive eﬀect that an
increase in the child allowance raises the fertility rate and the negative eﬀect that this
brings about decrease in income transfer to older people, the decrease in lifetime income
13decreases the fertility rate.
5 Conclusions and Remarks
This paper presented an examination of policies related to child care and income transfer
to older people with a pay-as-you-go pension system model introduced with endogenous
fertility. The analyses described herein yielded the following results. First, if fertility
is within a certain range under some parameter conditions, the relation between the
economic growth rate and fertility is positive. However, if fertility is either lower or
higher, this relation becomes negative. Moreover, with high child-care costs, the relation
is always negative.
Second, policies to support an increase in income transfer to older people do not
always increase the income of older people. An increase in income transfer ﬁnanced by
income taxation might increase the economic growth rate. However, this policy might
decrease the fertility rate, thereby ultimately decreasing the income of older people. In
contrast, an increase in income transfer to older people always raises the fertility rate.
Then, if fertility is in some range, this policy increases the economic growth rate, so the
income received by older people increases.
Finally, an increase in the child allowance does not always raise the fertility rate.
Therefore, it is desirable to raise the fertility rate by a policy including increased income
transfer ﬁnanced by a consumption tax. Thereby, the government can achieve two policy
goals: it can simultaneously increase fertility under a society with fewer children and
secure the income level of older people.
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Fig. 3: Transfer for the Old and Child Allowance in the National General Account
in Japan (Data: Annual Reports on Health and Welfare (2008))
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Fig. 4-1: Dynamics of Fertility (Monotonic Convergence)
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Fig. 9-2: Increase in the Consumption Income Tax Rate τc and Fertility
23